The Auditor’s Application of Professional Judgment: Evidence from M&A-related Critical Audit Matters by Ai, Xi
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
8-2021 
The Auditor’s Application of Professional Judgment: Evidence 
from M&A-related Critical Audit Matters 
Xi Ai 
xai2@vols.utk.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ai, Xi, "The Auditor’s Application of Professional Judgment: Evidence from M&A-related Critical Audit 
Matters. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2021. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/6534 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee 
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact 
trace@utk.edu. 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Xi Ai entitled "The Auditor’s Application of 
Professional Judgment: Evidence from M&A-related Critical Audit Matters." I have examined the 
final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be 
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a 
major in Business Administration. 
Linda A. Myers, Major Professor 
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: 
James N. Myers, Lauren M. Cunningham, Larry A. Fauver 
Accepted for the Council: 
Dixie L. Thompson 
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
The Auditor’s Application of Professional Judgment:  














A Dissertation Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Degree 


























 This work is dedicated to my parents, Siyu Ai and Man Wang. I could not have achieved 
this degree without your unconditional love and never-ending support. 
 This work is also dedicated to my fiancé, Simon Yu. Thank you for always believing in 





I gratefully acknowledge the support of my dissertation committee: Linda Myers (Chair), 
James Myers, Lauren Cunningham, and Larry Fauver. Their guidance was critical to the 
completion of my dissertation. I especially thank Linda and Lauren for their mentorship and 
friendship throughout my time in the phd program. I also appreciate the feedback and 
suggestions from my fellow doctoral students (Jason Ashby, Jack Badger, Jason Bangert, Laurie 
Ereddia, Kory Maag, Stefan Slavov, and Danielle Stanley). I am grateful for the generous 
financial support from the University of Tennessee, the Haslam College of Business, and the 
Department of Accounting and Information Management.  
A special thanks to my American parents, Mike and Nancy Branscum, for providing me a 
home away from home ever since I came to the United States. You truly made me feel loved and 
supported. I also want to thank my American sister, Katharine Haydar, for introducing me to 
your family and being the sister I have always wanted.  
I am grateful for everyone at the Liverpool Football Club for teaching me how much a 













In this study, I examine the extent to which auditor attributes affect the auditor’s decision 
to communicate a Critical Audit Matter (CAM) in the expanded auditor’s report. I expect the 
CAM communication decision to be adversely affected by threats to independence and by 
auditor overconfidence. I focus on a sample of companies that completed material mergers and 
acquisitions because these are likely to be considered as potential CAMs by meeting the minimal 
requirements of a CAM (i.e., material accounts or disclosures that involve especially 
challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment). Contrary to expectations, I find that the 
auditor’s CAM communication decision is influenced by the complexity of the M&A transaction 
and operations – a rather objective reason for communicating a CAM. While I find variation in 
CAM communication frequencies by the audit firm, I find little evidence suggesting that auditor 
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Auditors must exercise judgment in nearly every aspect of the audits they perform, from 
risk assessment through audit documentation.1 In 2017, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) released a new auditing standard to expand the auditor’s report, 
Auditing Standard (AS) 3101 The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When 
the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion. This new standard requires auditors to identify 
and communicate Critical Audit Matter (CAM) that relates to material accounts or disclosures 
and that involves “especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment” (PCAOB 
2017). As the PCAOB states in its 2019 Staff Guidance, the Board expects that auditor judgment 
will influence the determination and communication of CAMs (PCAOB 2019). In this study, I 
use the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) setting to examine the determinants of an auditor’s 
CAM communication decision. Specifically, I use a sample of companies that completed 
material acquisitions in the initial year that is subject to AS 3101 and examine whether 
engagement-specific auditor attributes influence the auditor’s decision to communicate M&A-
related CAMs while controlling for the complexity of the audit matter and the complexity of the 
company’s operations and accounting systems.  
Although CAMs span a variety of topics, I focus on the M&A setting for several reasons. 
First, it is reasonable to assume that auditors will consider accounts or disclosures related to 
material M&As as potential CAMs and must exercise professional judgment in their CAM 
communication decision. The communication of a CAM is the joint product of the underlying 
audit matter meeting the PCAOB’s definition of a CAM and the auditor exercising professional 
 
1 The use of professional judgment is discussed in the auditing standards published by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). See AS 1001 Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor, AS 
1015 Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work, and AS 1215 Audit Documentation. 
2 
judgment to communicate the identified CAM in the expanded auditor’s report. Because M&As 
are inherently risky and complex transactions, auditors need to apply substantial professional 
judgment when auditing the combined entity, especially in the audits of material accounts or 
disclosures arising from the M&A. As auditors develop a list of potential CAMs,2 accounts or 
disclosures related to material M&A transactions are very likely to be considered as potential 
CAMs. Therefore, by focusing on audit matters that are highly likely to meet the definition of a 
CAM and by controlling for the complexity of the audit and operations, my setting allows me to 
more cleanly explore the factors associated with the professional judgment that auditors apply in 
their decision to communicate a CAM.  
Moreover, restricting the focus to M&A-related audit matters ensures that the type of 
auditor judgment involved in auditing the underlying audit matter is consistent across audit 
engagements. All acquiring companies, regardless of the industry they are in, are required to 
record all acquired assets and liabilities at fair values on the acquisition date in accordance with 
Accounting Standards Code (ASC) 805 Business Combinations. Therefore, the auditor judgment 
involved in auditing companies that recently completed material acquisitions relates primarily to 
assessing the fair values of the accounts and disclosures that arise from the transaction. Because 
auditing different accounts and disclosures will require different types of auditor judgment and 
the type of auditor judgment required in auditing M&A-related accounts and disclosures are 
consistent across audit engagements, limiting the scope to M&A-related CAMs allows me to 
focus on the factors that influence auditor judgment involved in communicating CAMs. 
Additionally, M&A-related CAMs are regularly referred to in professional publications when 
 




providing implementation guidance on the expanded auditor’s report.3 It is not surprising, then, 
that M&A is one of the topics with the highest number of CAMs among the initial adopters of AS 
3101.   
Auditors create communicative value to financial statement users by disclosing 
information about the audit engagement in the auditor’s report (Coram et al. 2011). To improve 
the relevance and informativeness of the auditor’s report, AS 3101 requires auditors to not only 
identify CAM(s) but also explain why auditors determined that an audit matter qualified as a 
CAM. The standard also requires auditors to provide additional discussions around how they 
addressed the CAM in the audit, including a brief overview of the procedures performed and an 
indication of the outcomes of the audit procedures. On the one hand, auditors have incentives to 
communicate CAMs when they believe the communicated CAM improves the usefulness of the 
auditor’s report, which can demonstrate the quality of their service especially in complex 
situations such as M&As. Post-implementation comments from investors confirm that CAM 
communications benefit them with more constructive conversations with management because 
they are able to better understand the auditor’s work.4 On the other hand, auditors may feel 
pressured to minimize the number of CAMs reported. Some companies argue that the 
communication of CAMs will allow auditors to provide information that has not been made 
publicly available or may contradict the information already provided by management, adding 
 
3 Examples include the PCAOB’s response to public comments on the proposed auditor reporting standard in May 
2016, a discussion by the Center for Audit Quality in December 2018, and the PCAOB’s implementation guidance 








unnecessary tension to the auditor-client relationship.5 Some auditors reveal that they are hesitant 
to communicate a CAM because they incur additional costs in drafting, reviewing, and 
communicating each CAM and they do not believe that the expanded auditor’s report benefits 
financial statement users.6  
I expect two key attributes of the auditor to affect the auditor’s CAM communication 
decision – threats to independence and overconfidence. Threats to independence, proxied for by 
client importance and by the ratio of total fees generated from non-audit services, arise from 
economic incentives for the auditor to maintain its relationship with the client, thus making 
auditors more likely to report in alignment with their clients’ preference. Overconfidence, 
proxied for by the auditor's tenure and by the auditor’s prior experience with M&As, could allow 
the auditor to underweight the complexity of the audit matter and thus be less likely to 
communicate a CAM. Because the PCAOB notes in its final rule that the determination and 
communication of CAMs depend on the nature and complexity of the audit, which in turn 
depends on the complexity of the operations and accounting systems of the company, I also 
include factors related to M&A deal characteristics and company characteristics to isolate the 
influence of auditor characteristics on the auditor’s CAM communication decision.  
I manually collect a sample of initial adopters of AS 3101 (i.e., large accelerated filers 
with fiscal year-ends on or after June 30, 2019) that have completed at least one material M&A 
in the fiscal year subject to the new auditor reporting standard. For the 621 initial adopters that 
 










completed material M&As, 292 auditors communicate M&A-related CAMs in auditors’ reports 
(47 percent). I find that the total number of CAMs in the auditor’s report and the frequency of 
M&A-related CAMs vary by the audit firm, suggesting that firm-specific policies and training 
affect auditors’ judgment in the CAM communication decision. However, after controlling for 
deal and company characteristics that capture the complexity of the audit matter and the 
complexity of the company’s operations and accounting systems, I fail to find a significant 
association between auditor characteristics and M&A-related CAMs communicated in the 
expanded auditor’s report. It suggests that neither threats to independence, nor overconfidence, 
significantly affect the auditor's professional judgment involved in the decision to communicate 
a CAM. Consistent with the PCAOB’s statement, I find that the decision is driven by M&A deal 
characteristics (deal size, whether the company completed multiple acquisitions in the fiscal 
year, and whether the company is a serial acquirer) and company characteristics (e.g., the 
number of business and geographic segments, international operations). Taken together, these 
results suggest that the auditor’s CAM communication decision is not random and that it is 
driven by the complexity of the audit matter and operations, rather than the engagement-specific 
auditor attributes.  
My study contributes to the literature on auditor judgment. Experimental studies directly 
observe the factors that affect auditor judgment and document the consequences of inappropriate 
judgment (Leung and Trotman 2005, Bratten et al. 2013, Griffith et al. 2015). My study adds to 
the line of prior empirical studies that draw indirect inferences about auditor judgment based on 
publicly observable auditor characteristics. Several studies find evidence of auditor 
characteristics affecting auditor judgment observed indirectly through goodwill impairment 
(Carcello et al. 2020), asset impairment (Stein 2019), and going concern opinions (Blay and 
6 
Geiger 2013). I observe auditor judgment through CAMs communicated in the auditor’s report 
and find that auditor characteristics do not significantly influence the professional judgment 
auditors apply when making reporting decisions.  
I also contribute to the growing literature on the expanded auditor’s report, including 
CAMs in the United States (U.S.) and Key Audit Matters (KAMs) internationally. Experimental 
studies show that CAMs/KAMs influence how financial statement users view the information 
provided in the auditor’s report (Christensen et al. 2014, Boolaky and Quick 2016, Sirois et al. 
2018, Kachelmeier et al. 2019). Empirical studies generally explore the overall impact of the 
expanded auditor’s report and find mixed evidence (Gutierrez et al. 2018, Goh et al. 2019, Reid 
et al. 2019, Lennox et al. 2019, Liao et al. 2019, Burke et al. 2020, Drake et al. 2020). My study 
is among the first to examine CAMs in a specific category, which allows me to focus on audit 
matters meeting the minimal requirement of a CAM and draw inferences on the factors that 
influence auditor judgment. My findings indicate that the auditor’s decision to communicate a 
CAM is driven by the complexity of the underlying audit matter rather than auditor 
characteristics expected to proxy for potential biases or judgment tendencies. 
My study responds to the PCAOB’s call for more information to fully understand the 
auditor’s communication of CAMs following the implementation of AS 3101.7 Specifically, my 
study concludes that the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM is driven by the complexity 
of the underlying audit matter and the company’s operations, rather than engagement-specific 
auditor attributes or firm-level policies and training. These findings should also be of interest to 
 
7 See “Post-Implementation Review of AS 3101, The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When 




audit committees responsible for overseeing the audit engagement and to investors relying on the 
auditor’s report. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses my expectations 
and presents my research design. Section III describes my sample. Section IV provides empirical 
results, and Section V concludes. 
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SECTION II. EXPECTATIONS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Critical Audit Matters 
 Although companies’ operations have become more complex and auditors have been 
required to perform procedures involving more challenging judgment, the format of the auditor’s 
report has changed little since the 1940s (PCAOB 2017). In the auditor’s report, the auditor 
expresses his or her opinions on the financial statements. Unqualified opinions provide 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatements in 
accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), whereas qualified and 
adverse opinions suggest at least one material departure from GAAP.8 Because a vast majority of 
public companies receive unqualified opinions (Lennox 2005, Gray et al. 2011) and because 
auditors use standardized language in the auditor’s report, investors argue that the auditor’s 
report provides little information when opinions are unqualified and meaningful information 
only in extreme circumstances.9 To increase the informativeness and relevance of the auditor’s 
report, the PCAOB proposed significant changes to the auditor reporting model in May 2016 and 
adopted the final standard, AS 3101, in June 2017 (PCAOB 2017). The newly adopted standard 
retains the traditional types of audit opinions while requiring auditors to provide new information 
about the audit by communicating CAMs in the auditor’s report.  
 In its final rule, the PCAOB defines CAMs as “matters communicated or required to be 
communicated to the audit committee and that (1) relate to accounts or disclosures that are 
material to the financial statements, and (2) involve especially challenging, subjective, or 
complex auditor judgment (PCAOB 2017).” CAMs cover a wide range of topics – revenue, 
 
8 Another type of audit opinions is disclaimers, indicating that the auditor is unable to form opinions due to 
insufficient audit evidence. 
9 See “Improving the Auditor’s Report,” available at 
https://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/03162011_IAGMeeting/Role_Of_The_Auditor.pdf. 
9 
intangible assets, contingent liabilities, income taxes, and many others. In my study, I focus 
specifically on M&A-related CAMs because accounts or disclosures related to material M&As 
are most likely to qualify as CAMs. Prior to the adoption of AS 3101, auditors were not able to 
provide information about the M&A transaction in the traditional binary “pass/fail” auditor 
reporting model. In the expanded auditor’s report, auditors have the opportunity to provide 
information about their audit of a newly combined entity, especially about the accounts or 
disclosures related to M&As, if the audit matter meets the definition of a CAM, regardless of the 
type of opinion they issue. For example, WestRock Company, a large accelerated filer based in 
Atlanta, Georgia, completed its acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation in the 
company’s first fiscal quarter. EY issued an unqualified opinion with three CAMs (“Accounting 
for the Acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation,” “Test of Goodwill for 
Impairment,” and “Uncertain Tax Positions”), one of which is an M&A-related CAM. 
Specifically, in the auditor’s report, EY states that its audit of the purchase price allocation 
involved “especially subjective and complex judgments” and provides a discussion about how 
the auditor addressed this CAM in its audit, which includes testing the controls related to the 
accounting for the acquisition, engaging valuation specialists to assist with its evaluation of 
management assumptions, and performing sensitivity analyses of several accounts involved in 
the transaction. Appendix A provides EY’s audit report for WestRock Company issued on 
November 15, 2019.  
Literature Review on CAMs 
 To improve the informativeness and relevance of the auditor’s report, regulators and 
standard setters worldwide adopted an expanded auditor reporting model requiring auditors to 
report CAMs/KAMs (Financial Reporting Council 2013, IAASB 2015, PCAOB 2017). 
10 
Experimental studies find that the information communicated in CAMs/KAMs alters the 
behavior of management (Bentley et al. 2020) and audit committees (Kang 2019), the decisions 
of financial statement users (Christensen et al. 2014, Boolaky and Quick 2016, Ozlanski 2019, 
Rapley et al. 2018), and the perceived liability of auditors (Brasel et al. 2016, Gimbar et al. 2016, 
Kachelmeier et al. 2019). Several empirical studies use the U.K. setting to assess the information 
content of the new auditor’s report and its impact on the stock and debt markets. Gutierrez et al. 
(2018) conclude that investors do not find the expanded auditor’s report incrementally 
informative and Lennox et al. (2019) document that the lack of incremental information is due to 
companies disclosing information in other channels before the release of the auditor’s report. 
Porumb et al. (2019) show that the expanded auditor’s report improves lending terms by 
reducing information asymmetry. Reid et al. (2019) and Smith (2019) examine the overall 
impact of adopting the new auditor’s reporting model and find that both the readability of the 
auditor’s report (Smith 2019) and the client’s financial reporting quality (Reid et al. 2019) 
improves. Empirical studies outside of the U.K. find that the expanded auditor’s report provides 
incremental information to investors in China (Goh et al. 2019), although investors in France 
(Bedard et al. 2019) and Hong Kong (Liao et al. 2019) do not find the expanded auditor’s report 
incrementally informative.  
 After CAM reporting became effective for large accelerated filers in the U.S. on June 30, 
2019, several studies have explored the impact of the expanded auditor reporting model. 
Although the PCAOB intended to improve the relevance and informativeness of the auditor’s 
report, Files and Gencer (2020) and Luo (2021) document that investors in the U.S. do not find 
CAMs informative. Klevak et al. (2020) find that greater amounts of CAM disclosures indicate 
greater uncertainty. Burke et al. (2020) document that management improves its disclosures as 
11 
an indirect benefit of the new auditor reporting standard. Drake et al. (2020) document that tax-
related CAMs indirectly benefit investors by constraining tax-related earnings management. My 
study is among the first to focus on CAMs in a specific category. By examining audit matters 
that are highly likely to meet the definition of a CAM, I study the factors that determine the 
auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM in the auditor’s report.  
Expectations Development 
  A long line of experimental research shows that auditor-specific attributes are associated 
with auditor judgment. Several studies investigate auditor judgment in the engagement planning 
stage and find that auditor judgment of fraud risk is influenced by the auditor’s fraud knowledge 
(Hammersley 2011), internal controls knowledge (Hammersley et al. 2011), planning stage effort 
(Hammersley et al. 2010), and brainstorming sessions (Carpenter 2007, Hoffman and Zimbelman 
2009). Other studies examine auditor judgment in the audits of complex estimates and find that 
auditor judgment is influenced by the auditor’s mindset (Griffith et al. 2015), attitude (Nolder 
and Kadous 2018), and use of specialists (Griffith 2018). Bratten et al. (2013) document that 
environmental factors and task factors also influence auditor judgment in the audits of complex 
estimates. 
 Although prior experimental studies examine various aspects of auditor judgment, it is 
nonetheless difficult to observe and measure empirically. Following prior literature and the 
CAQ’s Professional Judgment Resources,10 I develop a set of auditor characteristics that I expect 
to affect the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM. 
  
 
10 See “Professional Judgment Resources”, available at https://www.thecaq.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/professional-judgment-resource.pdf. 
12 
Threats to Independence 
 As stated by the PCAOB in AS 1005 Independence, it is critically important for auditors 
to be independent because public confidence in the profession will be impaired if independence 
is lacking.11 Auditors have economic incentives to grow their business through retaining existing 
clients and gaining new clients. These economic incentives could pose threats to auditor 
independence when auditors try to please their clients, which further hinders auditors from 
appropriately applying professional judgment. Many companies opposed the CAM reporting 
requirements arguing that the communication of CAMs in the auditors’ report would blur the 
responsibilities of management and auditors (PCAOB 2017). In addition, some auditors 
expressed concerns that CAMs would increase the perceived liability of auditors and that they 
would incur additional costs while experiencing little improvement in the usefulness of the 
auditor’s report (PCAOB 2017). Therefore, given that companies pushed back on CAM 
reporting requirements and that auditors had their own hesitations, auditors have incentives to 
avoid communicating CAMs, particularly in situations where they face pressure from their 
clients and their independence is threatened. I posit that threats to independence will make the 
auditor less likely to communicate CAMs, ceteris paribus. 
 In my setting, I use two separate proxies for threats to independence. The first one is 
client importance. DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit fees create an economic bond between 
auditor and client. Consistent with this notion, prior studies show that the importance of a 
particular client relative to an auditor’s client portfolio in an office influences the incentive 
alignment between auditor and client (Craswell et al. 2002, Reynold and Francis 2000, Francis 
and Yu 2009). When auditors have incentives to bond with economically important clients, they 
 
11 See “AS 1005: Independence,” available at https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS1005.aspx.  
13 
face challenges in maintaining an independent mindset needed to exercise due professional care. 
Therefore, I posit that a client’s importance at the office level poses threats to independence, 
which can adversely affect the auditor’s CAM communication decision.  
 The second one is the ratio of total fees generated from non-audit services. Regulators 
generally view the auditor’s provision of non-audit services as a threat to auditor independence, 
arguing that it enlarges the economic bonding between the two parties (SEC 2002, PCAOB 
2011). Prior studies find that the provision of non-audit services hinders auditors from 
appropriately applying professional judgment in audit engagements, observed through a lower 
likelihood of the clients recording goodwill impairment (Carcello et al. 2000), the auditor’s 
failure to issue going-concern opinions to financially distressed clients (Blay and Geiger 2013), 
and the auditor’ failure to detect material weaknesses in the clients’ internal controls (Rice and 
Weber 2012). Because CAM reporting decision is in the list of auditor reporting decisions that 
auditors are required to make, I posit that the provision of non-audit services poses a threat to 
independence, which can adversely affect the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM.  
Overconfidence  
 In the audit context, overconfidence is the tendency that an auditor overestimates his or 
her ability to perform tasks or make decisions (CAQ 2019). Prior experimental studies document 
that overconfidence exists in the auditing profession (Owhoso and Weickgenannt 2009) and 
varies with task difficulty (Han et al. 2011). By definition, CAMs are audit matters that require 
auditors to exercise especially complex and challenging judgment when auditing the related 
accounts and disclosures. Because overconfident auditors can overestimate their abilities, they 
will be less likely to determine that the level of judgment involved is especially challenging or 
14 
complex, thus reducing the likelihood of them identifying an audit matter as a CAM. Therefore, I 
posit that overconfidence will make auditors less likely to communicate CAMs, ceteris paribus. 
 In my setting, I use two separate proxies for overconfidence. The first one is auditor 
M&A expertise. A long line of studies explores the relation between various types of auditor 
expertise and find that expert auditors provide high-quality audits (Dunn and Mayhew 2004, 
Knechel et al. 2007, Reichelt and Wang 2010, McGuire et al. 2012, Christensen et al. 2016, 
Haislip et al. 2016, Ahn et al. 2020). In the context of M&As, Gal-Or et al. (2019) find that 
companies audited by M&A expert auditors exhibit higher financial reporting quality in the post-
acquisition period. Auditors with M&A expertise are familiar with the accounting standards 
around business combinations and have experience evaluating the management assumptions and 
estimates in M&As. Therefore, I posit that auditor M&A expertise creates a potential judgment 
tendency of overconfidence that can affect the auditor's judgment in the decision to communicate 
an M&A-related CAM. Specifically, if auditors with M&A expertise already exhibit higher audit 
quality over the accounts and disclosures related to M&As, they may be less likely to determine 
that the judgment or difficulties involved arise to a “critical” audit matter. 
 The second one is the auditor’s client-specific knowledge, which the auditor accumulates 
from serving as the client’s auditor over a period of time. The PCAOB perceives long auditor-
client tenure as a threat to audit quality, arguing that long tenure breeds familiarity (PCAOB 
2011, 2017). However, most empirical studies find that client-specific knowledge from long 
auditor tenure helps auditors constrain management’s discretion in financial reporting because 
client-specific knowledge leads to more effective engagement planning and execution (Geiger 
and Raghunandan 2002, Johnson et al. 2002, Myers et al. 2003). I posit that client-specific 
knowledge from long auditor tenure creates a potential judgment tendency of overconfidence 
15 
that can negatively affect the auditor's judgment in the auditor’s decision to communicate an 
M&A-related CAM. Specifically, if auditors accumulate a substantial understanding of the 
client’s risk, operations, and accounting systems from serving as the client’s auditor, they may be 
less likely to determine that the judgment involved arise to a “critical” audit matter. 
Research Design 
 To examine the factors that influence the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-
related CAM, I estimate the following logistic model: 
CAMit = α1 IMPORTANCE it + α2NAS it + α3 ACQ_EXPERTit  + α4 TENUREit + α5 DEAL_SIZEit +         
α6 MULTIPLE_ACQit + α7 GOODWILLit + α8 SERIALit + α9 INTAN_GROWit +          
α10 RESTATEit + α11 ARCit + α12 SIZEit + α13 LEVit + α14 MTBit + α15 LOSSit +                
α16 FOREIGNit + α17 SEGit + α18 INTANit-1 + α19 TOTAL_CAMit +                          
Auditor Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + εit                                                       (1)                                                                     
 
where i and t represent the audited company and fiscal year, respectively.  
CAM is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor communicates a CAM related to 
M&As in the expanded auditor’s report, and zero otherwise. The Audit Analytics CAMs dataset 
provides the topics of CAMs and I use CAMs categorized under the topic of “business 
combinations” to construct this variable.12 
My first set of determinants relates to the factors associated with auditor characteristics. I 
use two auditor characteristics to proxy for threats to independence – client importance and the 
proportion of fees from non-audit services. Following Francis and Yu (2009), I define client 
importance (IMPORTANCE) as the ratio of the client’s total fees to the sum of fees for all clients 
in the audit office. Following Carcello et al. (2020), I use the ratio of non-audit service fees to 
total fees (NAS) to measure auditor independence.13 I use two auditor characteristics to proxy for 
 
12 Prior to the availability of this dataset, I hand collected 132 M&A-related CAMs and find that Audit Analytics’ 
classification of “business combinations” CAMs agrees with my hand collected data in all cases. 
13 Inferences remain unchanged when I use the natural log of NAS fees instead of the ratio of NAS fees. 
16 
overconfidence – auditor M&A expertise and tenure. Following Gal-Or et al. (2019), I define 
auditor M&A expertise (ACQ_EXPERT) as an indicator variable set equal to one if at least 30 
percent of all clients at an audit office completed an acquisition in the current or prior two fiscal 
years, and zero otherwise.14 I use auditor tenure (TENURE) to measure the auditor’s client-
specific knowledge and define it as the natural log of the auditor’s tenure measured in years.15  
In its final rule, the PCAOB states that the determination of CAM will depend on the 
nature and complexity of the audit, which in turn depends on the complexity of the company’s 
operations and accounting systems (PCAOB 2017). Therefore, I posit that, in addition to the 
auditor characteristics, the complexity of the M&A transaction, operations, and accounting 
systems will also influence the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM.  
My second set of determinants relates to M&A deal characteristics that proxy for the 
complexity of the audit matter. CAMs are audit matters related to accounts or disclosures that are 
material to financial statements and my discussions with audit partners confirm that deal size is 
the first factor they consider when determining whether to communicate an M&A-related 
CAM.16 Because deal size is the most important factor in determining an M&A-related CAM, I 
find that the strongest relation between the set of determinants and the likelihood of the auditor 
communicating an M&A-related CAM exists when I measure deal size using quintile ranks. 
Specifically, I first compute the materiality of the deal (DEAL_MATERIALITY), defined as the 
 
14 Inferences remain unchanged when I follow Gal-Or et al. (2019) and define auditor M&A expertise as an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the auditor audit 30 clients that completed M&As in the current and previous 
two years, and zero otherwise. 
15 One auditor characteristic commonly used in prior audit studies is auditor office size (e.g., Choi et al. 2010). 
Consistent with Francis and Yu (2009), I find that client importance is highly correlated with office size. Because 
including both variables raises the concern of multicollinearity, I only include client importance in my model. I find, 
untabulated, that my inferences remain unchanged when I include office size as an additional auditor characteristic 
in the model. 
16 I thank one anonymous Big4 audit partner and one anonymous non-Big4 audit partner for discussions about 
CAMs. 
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transaction value of the M&A deal scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal period.17 I 
then construct deal size (DEAL_SIZE) based on the quintile of DEAL_MATERIALITY. 
DEAL_SIZE takes the value of 1 through 5, with 5 indicating the largest deals (i.e., deals in the 
top quintile based on DEAL_MATERIALITY). Moreover, companies can engage in multiple 
acquisitions in a fiscal year. Integrating business operations and accounting systems multiple 
times in one fiscal year could prove difficult for the combined entity, which can also create 
challenges for the auditor. Therefore, I include whether the company completed multiple 
acquisitions in a fiscal year (MULTIPLE_ACQ) as a deal characteristic. In addition, one key 
component in acquisition accounting is goodwill. Li et al. (2011) suggest that goodwill is 
attributable to overpayment for the target and that investors perceive goodwill impairments 
negatively because they indicate declines in future profitability. I include the percentage of the 
purchase price allocated to goodwill (GOODWILL) as a deal characteristic. Furthermore, 
companies differ in M&A strategies: some complete frequent M&As as a primary way to expand 
their operations, whereas others engage in M&As only when they find a suitable target. The 
management of serial acquirers is more experienced at developing estimates and fair values for 
the targets, possibly by engaging valuation experts that they are familiar with. Therefore, I 
include serial acquirer (SERIAL) as a deal characteristic. Additionally, ASC 805 Business 
Combinations requires the acquirer to record the net identifiable assets of the target at the fair 
values on the acquisition date. Unlike tangible assets, intangible assets (e.g., customer 
relationships, trademarks) do not have readily available fair market values. Management must 
estimate the fair values of these intangible assets and auditors must assess the management’s 
estimates in the audits of the combined entity. Because auditing intangible assets involve 
 
17 When the company completed multiple acquisitions in the fiscal period, I use the sum of the transaction value 
from all M&A deals to compute DEAL_MATERIALITY.  
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substantial auditor judgment, I include growth in intangible assets (excluding goodwill) as a deal 
characteristic (INTAN_GROW). 
My last set of determinants relates to company characteristics that proxy for the 
complexity of operations and accounting systems. Because companies that announce 
restatements of their financial statements are scrutinized by investors and analysts (Palmrose et 
al. 2004), I include a restatement announcement indicator (RESTATE). Because CAMs depend 
on the complexity of the accounting system of the company (PCAOB 2017), I control for the 
accounting reporting complexity (ARC) following Hoitash and Hoitash (2018). Because the 
determination and communication of CAMs also depend on the complexity of the operations of 
the company, I control for the size (SIZE, FOREIGN, SEG), financial condition (LEV, LOSS), 
and growth (MTB) of the company. In addition, I control for the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets at the beginning of the period (INTAN) and the total number of CAMs communicated by 
the auditor (TOTAL_CAM). 
I define industries based on the division classification provided by the North America 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) Association. Due to the small number of non-Big4 
auditors in my sample, I combine all non-Big4 auditors into one auditor category when 
constructing auditor fixed effects, and each of the Big4 auditors is in its own auditor category. 
All variables are measured as defined in Appendix B. 
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SECTION III. DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Sample  
To examine my research question, I restrict the sample to the initial adopters of PCAOB 
AS 3101 (i.e., large accelerated filers with fiscal year-ends on or after June 30, 2019, and on or 
before June 30, 2020). I then manually search the annual financial statements of these companies 
to determine whether they have completed at least one material acquisition in the fiscal year 
subject to the CAM reporting requirements. I identify M&As by searching their 10-K filings for 
“acquisition(s)”, “merger(s)”, and “business combination(s)”. Because CAMs relate to accounts 
or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, I remove M&A deals that these 
companies identified as “immaterial” in the 10-Ks.18 For this sample of companies completing at 
least one material acquisition, I use the Audit Analytics CAMs dataset to identify whether the 
auditor communicates a CAM related to M&As in the auditor’s report. I define M&A-related 
CAMs as CAMs categorized under the topic of “business combinations”. I eliminate 
observations where I could not identify auditor, deal, or company characteristics. I first run 
equation (1) using a Linear Probability Model to identify influential observations. Following 
Leone et al. (2019), I remove 47 influential observations identified using influence diagnostics 
(Cook’s Distance). My final sample consists of 621 large accelerated filers that are initial 
 
18 A commonly used database for M&A deals is the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. Because it does not 
differentiate between material and immaterial acquisitions and because immaterial acquisitions do not meet the 
definition of a CAM, I manually search the 10-Ks to identify material acquisitions instead of using the SDC Mergers 
and Acquisitions database. For example, Walmart Inc. completed the acquisition of Flipkart, a foreign eCommerce 
business, in the second quarter of fiscal 2020 for cash consideration of $16 billion and identified the Flipkart 
acquisition as immaterial in the 10-K 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416920000011/wmtform10-kx1312020.htm). I exclude 
this deal from my sample because the company identified it as an immaterial acquisition in the 10-K. 
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adopters of AS 3101 and that completed material M&As in the initial year subject to PCAOB AS 
3101. I report my sample construction procedures in Table 1 Panel A. 
 Table 1 Panel B reports the sample distribution by industry following the industry 
division classification by the NAICS Association. Auditors, on average, report 1.8 CAMs, 
consistent with the early evidence in Hollie (2019). The industry with the largest number of 
completed material acquisitions is the manufacturing industry. Significant variation across 
industries exists in the likelihood of the auditor communicating an M&A-related CAM in the 
auditor’s report.  
 Table 1 Panel C reports the sample distribution by auditor. EY has the largest presence in 
my sample with the highest number of clients that completed material acquisitions, the highest 
number of CAMs per client, and the frequency of M&A-related CAMs. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics of my initial sample. Table 2 Panel B 
reports descriptive statistics of my final sample after removing influential observations. The 
variable exhibiting the largest difference between Panel A and Panel B is DEAL_MATERIALITY. 
The mean (standard deviation) decreases from 0.1 to 0.096 (from 0.182 to 0.148).  
As reported in Table 2 Panel B, fees from a specific client are 12.4 percent of total fees 
from all clients in an engagement office and 15.4 percent of total fees are from non-audit 
services on average. Consistent with Gal-Or et al. (2019), 4 percent of auditors are M&A 
experts. Auditors have a mean tenure of 15 years. Regarding M&A deal characteristics, the 
M&A deal value is 14.8 percent of the acquirer’s total assets at the beginning of the year and 34 
percent of companies completed more than one acquisition in the initial year subject to PCAOB 
AS 3101. Companies allocate 46.1 percent of the total purchase price to goodwill on average and 
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23.5 percent of sample companies completed at least one acquisition in each of the current and 
previous two fiscal years. The acquiring companies grow the intangibles assets 1 percent after 
acquisition completion on average.  
Table 2 Panel C reports the tests of difference in means between companies with and 
without an M&A-related CAM. In univariate tests, I do not find significant differences in the 
auditor characteristics. Regarding M&A deal characteristics, companies with M&A-related 
CAMs engage in larger deals. Regarding company characteristics, companies with M&A-related 
CAMs are smaller in size, more likely to have a loss, have a lower market-to-book ratio, are less 
likely to have foreign operations, report a smaller number of business and geographic segments, 
and report a higher proportion of intangible assets. For companies with M&A-related CAMs, 
auditors communicate significantly more CAMs in the auditor’s report. 
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SECTION IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Determinants of M&A-related CAMs 
 Table 3 reports the relation between auditor and deal characteristics and the 
communication of M&A-related CAMs. I examine whether auditor characteristics determine the 
auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM excluding and including  audit firm 
indicators in Columns (1) and (2) respectively. In Column (1), I fail to find that auditor 
characteristics are significantly associated with the likelihood of the auditor communicating an 
M&A-related CAM at conventional levels. These results suggest that threats to independence 
and overconfidence at the office level do not significantly influence the auditor’s CAM 
communication decision. In Column (2), I fail to find that auditor characteristics at both office 
and firm levels are significantly associated with the auditor’s CAM communication decision at 
conventional levels, except for one audit firm. Although audit firms have firm-specific policies 
and implemented firm-wide training to comply with the CAM reporting requirements,19 my 
results suggest that firm-specific characteristics do not significantly influence the auditor’s CAM 
communication decision. The area under the ROC curve is 0.534 and 0.596 respectively in 
Columns (1) and (2). I examine whether M&A deal characteristics determine the auditor’s 
decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM in Column (3). I find that deal size and whether 
the company completed multiple acquisitions in the initial year subject to AS 3101 are 
significantly associated with the likelihood of the auditor communicating an M&A-related CAM 
(p-value < 0.01). The area under the ROC curve is 0.899. In Column (4), I include auditor 
 






characteristics, audit firm indicators, and M&A deal characteristics. I consistently find that M&A 
deal characteristics are significantly associated with the auditor’s decision to communicate an 
M&A-related CAM and fail to find that auditor characteristics are significantly associated with 
the auditor’s CAM communication decision, except for one audit firm. The area under the ROC 
curve is 0.908. Overall, these results suggest that the auditor’s decision to communicate an 
M&A-related CAM is not random and that it is driven by the complexity of the underlying audit 
matter rather than engagement-specific auditor attributes. 
 Table 4 reports the relation between the auditor, deal, and company characteristics and 
the communication of M&A-related CAMs without fixed effects in Column (1), with audit firm 
fixed effects in Column (2), and with audit firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects in 
Column (3). I consistently fail to find that auditor characteristics are significantly associated with 
the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM at conventional levels. Regarding 
M&A deal characteristics, I consistently find that deal size and whether the company completed 
multiple acquisitions in the fiscal year are significantly associated with the auditor’s decision to 
communicate an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05 respectively). I find some 
evidence that whether the company is a serial acquirer significantly influences the auditor’s 
CAM communication decision. Regarding company characteristics, I consistently find that 
restatement announcement, size, and the number of segments are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of the auditor communicating an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.1, p-value < 0.05, 
and p-value < 0.05, respectively). I find some evidence that leverage and whether the company 
has foreign operations significantly influence the auditor’s CAM communication decision. The 
area under the ROC curve is above 0.96 in all three columns. Taken together, these results 
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suggest that the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM is driven by M&A 
deal characteristics and company characteristics. 
 In Table 5, I use stepwise logit regression to investigate the optimal combination of 
factors that influence the auditor’s decision to communicate an M&A-related CAM. By 
systematically eliminating variables that are the least helpful in explaining the outcome, stepwise 
logit regression is particularly helpful when there is a potential multicollinearity problem (Ou 
and Penman 1989, Charitou et al. 2004). Specifically, I estimate a stepwise logit regression using 
a backward elimination technique with all of the variables in my determinants model (i.e. auditor 
characteristics, deal characteristics, company characteristics, audit firm indicators, and industry 
indicators) and set the significance level for elimination at the 15 percent level following 
Dechow et al. (2011). Consistent with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, I fail to find that auditor 
characteristics determine the auditor’s CAM communication decision. However, I find that one 
audit firm is positively associated with the probability of communicating an M&A-related CAM 
(p-value < 0.05). Regarding M&A deal characteristics, I consistently find that multiple 
acquisitions is negatively associated with the communication of an M&A-related CAM (p-value 
< 0.1) and that deal size and serial acquirer are positively associated with the communication of 
an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.01 and p-value < 0.1 respectively). Regarding company 
characteristics, I find that restatement announcement, size of the company, foreign operations, 
and the number of segments are negatively associated with the communication of M&A-related 
CAMs (p-value < 0.05) and that the total number of CAMs is positively associated with the 
communication of an M&A-related CAM (p-value < 0.01). It suggests that auditors are less 
likely to communicate an M&A-related CAM when clients are larger and more complex. In 
addition, three industries are positively associated with the auditor’s decision to communicate an 
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M&A-related CAM. The area under the ROC curve is 0.968. Results consistently support that 
the auditor’s CAM communication decision is explained by the complexity of audit matter and 
operations rather than the auditor attributes. 
Robustness Test – Deal Size 
 As outlined by the PCAOB, CAMs are audit matters that relate to material accounts or 
disclosures. In my main analyses, I restrict the sample to M&A deals that management identifies 
as material in the annual financial statements. Larger deals are generally more complex, involve 
a higher degree of uncertainty, and receive more public scrutiny. Because CAMs are intended to 
provide more informative and relevant information to investors, auditors can become more likely 
to communicate M&A-related CAMs when deals are more material. Smaller deals should require 
less challenging audit judgment, which reduces the likelihood of the auditor identifying the audit 
matter as a CAM. To explore the influence of deal size, I re-estimate equation (1) by restricting 
the sample to deals to the middle three quintiles and the middle two quartiles based on deal size 
respectively.20 In untabulated tests, I consistently find that auditor characteristics do not 
influence the auditor’s decision to communicate a CAM and that the decision is driven by the 
complexity of the audit matter and operations. 
Robustness Test – M&As as the Primary Business  
 Whereas most companies engage in M&As when they find a target that suits their 
strategy, some companies frequently complete M&As as their primary business. Because these 
companies have different operations, the judgment that auditors exercise in the CAM 
communicating decision could be substantially different from the rest. In untabulated tests, I 
remove companies that frequently complete M&As as their primary business (in SIC 6211 
 
20 I include DEAL_MATERIALITY instead of DEAL_SIZE to proxy for the size of the deal.  
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Security Brokers, Dealers, and Flotation Companies, SIC 6282 Investment Advice, SIC 6500 
Real Estate, SIC 6512 Operators of Nonresidential Buildings, and SIC 6798 Real Estate 
Investment Trusts), and consistently find that the auditor’s CAM communication decision is 
driven by the complexity of the audit matter and operations rather than the auditor attributes. 
Robustness Test – Initial-year Audits 
 Although initial-year audits typically involve substantial effort from the auditor and 
impose extra costs, auditors generally lowball to gain the client’s business (Huang et al. 2009). 
As auditors face different economic incentives in the initial year audits, it can further affect the 
professional judgment they apply in the decision to communicate CAMs. In untabulated tests, I 
remove companies audited by auditors in their initial two years with the clients and consistently 
find that the auditor’s CAM communication decision is driven by deal and company 
characteristics. 
Additional Analysis – Predicted and Actual CAMs 
 Financial statement users only observe the CAMs communicated in the auditor’s report. 
However, it does not provide information about whether the auditors appropriately identified 
audit matters as CAMs. The PCAOB notes in its final rule that the determination of CAMs 
depends on the complexity of the audit and the complexity of the operations and accounting 
systems. Therefore, I first predict the likelihood of an M&A-related audit matter meeting the 
definition of a CAM (Probability_CAM) using deal and company characteristics that capture the 
complexity of the audit and the complexity of operations and accounting systems using the full 
sample. In Table 6 Panel A, I find that the mean probability of an M&A-related audit matter 
meeting the definition of a CAM is 46.9 percent. I define observations with a predicted 
probability above 0.7 as the cases where the auditor should communicate an M&A-related CAM 
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in the auditor’s report (Predict_CAM) and classify observations into four groups: consistent 
CAMs (CAM = 1 and Predict_CAM = 1), consistent non-CAMs (CAM = 0 and Predict_CAM = 
0), conservative CAMs (CAM = 1 and Predict_CAM = 0), and aggressive CAMs (CAM = 0 and 
Predict_CAM = 1). In Table 6 Panel B, I find that 80.5 percent of sample observations involve 
CAMs that are consistent between the predictions and the actual CAMs communicated in the 
auditor’s report. 14.8 (4.6) percent of sample observations involve auditors that are more 
conservative (aggressive) in their decision to report M&A-related CAMs. Because each audit 
firm has its own firm-wide policies and training, I explore whether the auditor’s CAM 
communication decision varies across audit firms. In Table 6 Panel C, I find that the frequency 
of CAMs in each group varies across audit firms. PwC is the auditor with the highest frequency 
of consistent CAMs. Among the Big4 audit firms, EY is the most conservative in communicating 
M&A-related CAMs. I next explore whether the auditor characteristics vary based on the 
auditor’s CAM communication decision. In Table 6 Panel D, I find some variation in the auditor 
characteristics across the four groups of auditors based on their CAM reporting behavior. 
However, the difference is not significant between any two groups. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the M&A-related CAMs communicated in the auditor’s report are generally 
consistent with the M&A-related audit matters that are predicted to meet the definition of CAMs 
and that audit firms exhibit systematic differences in their decision to communicate M&A-
related CAMs.  
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SECTION VI. CONCLUSION  
 To increase the informativeness and relevance of the auditor’s report, the PCAOB 
adopted AS 3101 in 2017, requiring auditors to communicate CAMs that relate to material 
accounts or disclosures of the financial statements and involve especially challenging, subjective, 
or complex auditor judgment. The communication of CAMs, including the identification of 
CAMs and the description of how the auditors addressed the CAMs in the audit, allows auditors 
to provide new information to financial statement users about how they exercise professional 
judgment in the audit. I use a sample of initial adopters of AS 3101 that completed material 
M&As to examine the factors that influence the auditor’s CAM communication decision. 
  After controlling for M&A deal characteristics and company characteristics, I fail to find 
that auditor characteristics at the office- and firm-level significantly influence the auditor’s CAM 
communication decision. Instead, the decision is driven by the complexity of the underlying 
audit matter and the complexity of operations. By documenting these results, I extend the 
literature on auditor judgment and on expanded auditor’s report. My study provides insights for 
the PCAOB, audit committees, and investors. 
 Importantly, my setting allows me to observe the auditor’s decision to communicate a 
CAM and empirically examine the factors that influence the auditor’s judgment in the CAM 
communication decision. However, the communication of a CAM does not provide evidence 
regarding whether the auditors deliver high-quality audits. As the PCAOB conduct inspections of 
audit firms and perform post-implementation reviews of the recently adopted standard, the 
PCAOB will provide more information on whether auditors have appropriately identified and 
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Appendix A. Example of Critical Audit Matters related to Mergers and Acquisitions 
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm 
The Board of Directors and Stockholders of 
WestRock Company 
Opinion on the Financial Statements 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of WestRock Company (the Company) as of September 30, 2019 and 2018, the related consolidated statements of 
income, comprehensive income, equity and cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended September 30, 2019, and the related notes (collectively referred to as the 
“consolidated financial statements”). In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Company at September 
30, 2019 and 2018, and the results of its operations and its cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended September 30, 2019, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
We also have audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) (PCAOB), the Company's internal control over financial 
reporting as of September 30, 2019, based on criteria established in Internal Control-Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (2013 framework), and our report dated November 15, 2019 expressed an unqualified opinion thereon. 
Adoption of New Accounting Standards 
As discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its method of accounting for revenue from contracts with customers and certain fulfillment 
costs in 2019 due to the adoption of ASC 606, Revenue from Contracts with Customers. 
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its classification of cash receipts on the deferred purchase price receivable on asset-backed 
securitization transactions in 2019 due to the adoption of ASU No. 2016-15, Statement of Cash Flows: Classification of Certain Cash Receipts and Cash Payments. 
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its presentation of non-service components of pension and other postretirement income 
(expense) in 2019 due to the adoption of ASU No. 2017-07, Compensation – Retirement Benefits (Topic 715): Improving the Presentation of Net Periodic Cost and Net Periodic 
Postretirement Benefit Cost. 
Basis for Opinion 
These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company’s financial statements based on our 
audits. We are a public accounting firm registered with the PCAOB and are required to be independent with respect to the Company in accordance with the U.S. federal securities 
laws and the applicable rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the PCAOB. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with the standards of the PCAOB. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether 
the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud. Our audits included performing procedures to assess the risks of material misstatement of 
the financial statements, whether due to error or fraud, and performing procedures that respond to those risks. Such procedures included examining, on a test basis, evidence regarding 
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. Our audits also included evaluating the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well 
as evaluating the overall presentation of the financial statements. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
Critical Audit Matters 
The critical audit matters communicated below are matters arising from the current period audit of the financial statements that were communicated or required to be communicated 
to the audit committee and that: (1) relate to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements and (2) involved our especially challenging, subjective or complex 
judgments. The communication of critical audit matters does not alter in any way our opinion on the consolidated financial statements, taken as a whole, and we are not, by 
communicating the critical audit matters below, providing separate opinions on the critical audit matters or on the accounts or disclosures to which they relate. 
  Accounting for the Acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation 
Description of the Matter During 2019, the Company completed its acquisition of KapStone Paper and Packaging Corporation (KapStone) for net consideration of $4.9 billion 
including debt assumed (the “Transaction”), as disclosed in Note 3 to the consolidated financial statements. The Transaction is accounted for as a business 
combination and the Company preliminarily allocated $1,303.0 million of the purchase price to the fair value of the acquired customer relationship 
intangible assets. The Company is in the process of analyzing the estimated values of all assets acquired and liabilities assumed including, among other 
things, finalizing third-party valuations of certain tangible and intangible assets, as well as the fair value of certain contracts and the determination of 
certain tax balances, therefore, the allocation of the purchase price is preliminary and subject to revision as of September 30, 2019. 
Auditing management's preliminary allocation of purchase price for its acquisition of KapStone involved especially subjective and complex judgements 
due to the significant estimation required in determining the fair value of customer relationship intangible assets. The significant estimation was primarily 
due to the complexity of the valuation models used to measure that fair value as well as the sensitivity of the respective fair values to the underlying 
significant assumptions. The significant assumptions used to estimate the fair value of the customer relationship intangible assets and subsequent 
amortization expense included discount rates, customer attrition rates and economic lives. These significant assumptions are forward-looking and could 
be affected by future economic and market conditions. 
How We Addressed the 
Matter in Our Audit 
We tested the design and operating effectiveness of the Company's controls related to the accounting for the KapStone acquisition. For example, we tested 
controls over the recognition and measurement of customer relationship intangible assets in the acquisition, including the Company’s controls over the 
valuation model, the mathematical accuracy of the valuation model and development of underlying assumptions used to develop such fair value 
measurement estimates.  
To test the fair value of the Company's customer relationship intangible assets, our audit procedures included, among others, evaluating the Company's 
valuation model, the method and significant assumptions used and testing the completeness and accuracy of the underlying data supporting the significant 
assumptions and estimates. We involved our valuation specialists to assist with our evaluation of the valuation model and certain significant assumptions. 
For example, we reconciled the discount rates to the projected internal rate of return for the Transaction and compared the attrition rates to industry data. 
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In addition, to evaluate the effect of changes in assumptions, we performed sensitivity analysis of the fair value of customer relationship intangible assets, 
and of amortization expense to the economic lives assigned to the customer relationship intangible assets. 
  Test of Goodwill for Impairment 
Description of the Matter At September 30, 2019, the Company’s goodwill is $7,285.6 million. As discussed in Note 1 of the consolidated financial statements, goodwill is tested 
for impairment at least annually at the reporting unit level. This requires management to estimate the fair value of the reporting units with goodwill 
allocated to them. 
Auditing management’s goodwill impairment tests involved especially subjective judgements due to the significant estimation required in determining 
the fair value of the reporting units. In particular, the estimates for the fair values of the Company’s reporting units are sensitive to assumptions such as 
the discount rate and expected future net cash flows, including projected operating results, capital expenditures and tax rates, which are affected by 
expectations about future market or economic conditions. 
How We Addressed the 
Matter in Our Audit 
We obtained an understanding, evaluated the design and tested the operating effectiveness of controls over the Company’s goodwill impairment review 
process. For example, we tested controls over the estimation of the fair values of the reporting units, including the Company’s controls over the valuation 
models, the mathematical accuracy of the valuation models and development of underlying assumptions used to develop such fair values of the reporting 
units. We also tested management’s review of the reconciliation of the aggregate estimated fair value of the reporting units to the market capitalization of 
the Company. 
To test the estimated fair values of the Company’s reporting units, our audit procedures included, among others, assessing the valuation methodology and 
the underlying data used by the Company in its analysis, including testing the significant assumptions discussed above. We compared the significant 
assumptions used by management to current industry and economic trends, changes to the Company’s business model and other relevant factors. We 
assessed the historical accuracy of management’s assumptions of future expected net cash flows and performed sensitivity analyses of significant 
assumptions to evaluate the changes in the fair values of the reporting units that would result from changes in the assumptions. We involved valuation 
specialists to assist in our evaluation of the valuation methodology and the significant assumptions, including the discount rate used in determining the 
fair values of the reporting units. We also tested the reconciliation of the aggregate estimated fair value of the reporting units to the market capitalization 
of the Company. 
          Uncertain Tax Positions 
Description of the Matter As discussed in Note 6 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company has unrecognized income tax benefits of $224.3 million related to its 
uncertain tax positions at September 30, 2019. The Company uses significant judgment in determining (1) whether a tax position, based solely on its 
technical merits, is more likely than not to be sustained upon examination, and (2) measuring the tax benefit as the largest amount of benefit which is 
more likely than not to be realized upon ultimate settlement. The Company does not record any benefit for the tax positions that do not meet the more-
likely-than-not initial recognition threshold. 
Auditing management’s analysis of its uncertain tax positions and resulting unrecognized income tax benefits involved especially subjective and complex 
judgements because each tax position carries unique facts and circumstances that require interpretation of laws, regulations and legal rulings, and other 
factors. 
How We Addressed the 
Matter in Our Audit 
We tested the Company’s controls that address the risks of material misstatement relating to uncertain tax positions. For example, we tested controls over 
management’s identification of uncertain tax positions and application of the two-step recognition and measurement principles, including management’s 
review of the inputs and resulting calculations of unrecognized income tax benefits. 
To test the Company’s measurement and recording of its uncertain tax positions, our audit procedures included, among others, inspecting the Company’s 
analysis and related tax opinions to evaluate the assumptions the Company used to develop its uncertain tax positions and related unrecognized income 
tax benefit amounts by jurisdiction. We also tested the completeness and accuracy of the underlying data used by the Company to calculate its uncertain 
tax positions. For example, we compared the unrecognized income tax benefits to similar positions in prior periods and assessed management’s 
consideration of current tax controversy and litigation trends in similar positions challenged by tax authorities. In addition, we involved tax subject matter 
resources to evaluate the application of relevant tax laws in the Company’s recognition determination. We also evaluated the Company’s income tax 
disclosures in relation to these matters included in Note 6 to the consolidated financial statements. 
  
/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 
We have served as the Company’s or its predecessor’s auditor since at least 1975, but we are unable to determine the specific year. 
Atlanta, Georgia 





Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition [Sources] 
Dependent Variable 
CAM Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor communicates a CAM under 
the topic of “business combinations”, and 0 otherwise [Audit Analytics] 
Auditor Characteristics 
IMPORTANCE The ratio of a client’s total fees to the sum of total fees for all clients in an 
office [Audit Analytics] 
NAS The sum of non-audit fees divided by total fees paid to the auditor [Audit 
Analytics] 
ACQ_EXPERT Indicator variable equal to 1 if at least 30% of all clients at an audit office 
completed an acquisition in the current or prior two fiscal years, and 0 
otherwise [Audit Analytics and SDC] 
TENURE The natural log of the tenure of the auditor measured in years [Audit 
Analytics] 
Deal Characteristics 
DEAL_SIZE The quintile of total deal value scaled by lagged total assets 
(DEAL_MATERIALITY), with a larger number indicating larger deals 
[Hand collection and Compustat] 
MULTIPLE_ACQ Indicator equal to 1 if the client completed more than one acquisition, and 
0 otherwise [Hand collection] 
GOODWILL Goodwill scaled by total deal value [Hand collection] 
SERIAL Indicator equal to 1 if the client completed an acquisition in each of the 
current and prior two years, and 0 otherwise [SDC] 
INTAN_GROW Growth in definite-lived and indefinite-lived intangible assets, excluding 
goodwill, divided by total assets [Compustat] 
Company Characteristics 
RESTATE Indicator equal to 1 if the client announced a restatement, and 0 otherwise 
[Audit Analytics] 
ARC Accounting Reporting Complexity of the company constructed based on 
the count of accounting items (XBRL) tags disclosed in the annual 
financial statements [XBRL Research Data by Hoitash and Hoitash] 
SIZE The log of total assets [Compustat] 
LEV Book value of debt divided by book value of assets [Compustat] 
MTB Market-to-Book ratio [Compustat] 
LOSS Indicator equal to 1 if the client reports a loss, and 0 otherwise 
[Compustat] 
FOREIGN Indicator equal to 1 if the client has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise 
[Compustat] 
SEG The sum of business segments and geographic segments [Compustat] 
INTAN The sum of definite-lived intangible assets, indefinite-lived intangible 
assets, and goodwill divided by total assets [Compustat] 
TOTAL_CAM The total number of CAMs in the auditor’s report [Audit Analytics] 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Composition 




Large accelerated filers with fiscal years ending on or after 6/30/2019 
and before 6/30/2020 
2005 
Companies identified in Compustat 1990 
Companies audited by auditors located in the United States 1880 
Companies completed material acquisitions  675 
Companies with non-missing auditor characteristics 673 
Companies with non-missing deal characteristics 673 
Companies with non-missing company characteristics 668 
Initial Sample 668 
Influential Observations based on Cook’s Distance (47) 
Final Sample 621  
 
Panel B. Observations by Industry 
Industry  N TOTAL_CAM 
Percentage 
(CAM=1) 
1-Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining, and 
Construction 
19 1.842 0.474 
2-Manufacturing 252 1.754 0.448 
3-Transportation, Communication, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services 
45 2.022 0.622 
4-Wholesale Trade 17 1.824 0.353 
5-Retail Trade 22 1.591 0.273 
6-Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 100 1.830 0.540 
7-Services 166 1.765 0.458 
Total 621   
Average  1.787 0.470 
 
Panel C. Observations by Auditor 
Auditor N TOTAL_CAM Percentage (CAM=1) 
1-PwC 150 1.713 0.453 
2-EY 170 2.041 0.565 
3-Deloitte 132 1.538 0.348 
4-KPMG 112 1.777 0.473 
5-Non Big4 57 1.825 0.509 
Total 621     
Average   1.787 0.470 
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Notes: This table reports the sample selection and distribution. Panel A reports the results of the sample selection. I 
remove 47 influential observations identified using influence diagnostics with a Cook’s Distance greater than 4/n. 
Panel B reports the distribution of observations by industry. I define industry following the classification provided 
by the NAICS Association. I combine companies in Division A (SIC 01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing), 
Division B (SIC 10-14 Mining), and Division C (SIC 15-17 Construction) into one industry because each industry 
has a small number of observations. Panel C reports the distribution of observations by the auditor. All variables are 




Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of the Initial Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Auditor characteristics         
   IMPORTANCE 668 0.131 0.179 0.013 0.025 0.063 0.156 0.324 
   NAS 668 0.153 0.129 0.006 0.047 0.129 0.229 0.332 
   ACQ_EXPERT 668 0.051 0.220 0 0 0 0 0 
   TENURE 668 2.708 0.924 1.609 2.079 2.833 3.296 3.912 
Deal characteristics                 
   DEAL_MATERIALITY 668 0.100 0.182 0.004 0.013 0.037 0.114 0.254 
   MULTIPLE_ACQ 668 0.332 0.471 0 0 0 1 1 
   GOODWILL 668 0.462 0.264 0.091 0.282 0.476 0.641 0.776 
   SERIAL 668 0.232 0.422 0 0 0 0 1 
   INTAN_GROW 668 0.011 0.091 -0.022 -0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.038 
Company characteristics                 
   RESTATE 668 0.091 0.288 0 0 0 0 0 
   ARC 668 457.413 138.798 304 357 431 545 640 
   SIZE 668 8.666 1.422 6.979 7.628 8.517 9.521 10.696 
   LEV 668 0.326 0.208 0.046 0.166 0.322 0.459 0.571 
   MTB 668 0.030 174.541 0.846 1.508 2.880 6.033 14.196 
   LOSS 668 0.295 0.456 0 0 0 1 1 
   FOREIGN 668 0.552 0.498 0 0 1 1 1 
   SEG 668 9.039 5.724 2 5 8 12 17 
   INTAN 668 0.327 0.232 0.035 0.107 0.307 0.517 0.656 
   TOTAL_CAM 668 1.801 0.777 1 1 2 2 3 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of the Final Sample 
Variable N Mean Std Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Auditor characteristics         
   IMPORTANCE 621 0.124 0.172 0.013 0.025 0.059 0.151 0.297 
   NAS 621 0.154 0.130 0.006 0.046 0.132 0.236 0.333 
   ACQ_EXPERT 621 0.040 0.197 0 0 0 0 0 
   TENURE 621 2.704 0.914 1.609 2.079 2.833 3.296 3.871 
Deal characteristics                 
   DEAL_MATERIALITY 621 0.096 0.148 0.004 0.012 0.037 0.113 0.251 
   MULTIPLE_ACQ 621 0.338 0.473 0 0 0 1 1 
   GOODWILL 621 0.461 0.263 0.100 0.282 0.476 0.638 0.773 
   SERIAL 621 0.235 0.424 0 0 0 0 1 
   INTAN_GROW 621 0.011 0.093 -0.022 -0.010 -0.002 0.003 0.040 
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TABLE 2 continued         
Company characteristics         
   RESTATE 621 0.085 0.280 0 0 0 0 0 
   ARC 621 455.768 135.196 306 357 429 540 640 
   SIZE 621 8.637 1.401 6.981 7.623 8.502 9.502 10.614 
   LEV 621 0.322 0.207 0.047 0.164 0.314 0.454 0.565 
   MTB 621 6.600 20.862 0.846 1.520 2.953 6.066 14.196 
   LOSS 621 0.287 0.453 0 0 0 1 1 
   FOREIGN 621 0.562 0.497 0 0 1 1 1 
   SEG 621 9.077 5.756 2 5 8 12 17 
   INTAN 621 0.331 0.232 0.038 0.111 0.310 0.523 0.658 
   TOTAL_CAM 621 1.787 0.766 1 1 2 2 3 
 
Panel C. Tests of Differences in Means 
Variable CAM = 1 CAM = 0 Difference 
 N Mean N Mean  
Auditor characteristics      
   IMPORTANCE 292 0.12 329 0.13 -0.005 
   NAS 292 0.15 329 0.16 -0.012 
   ACQ_EXPERT 292 0.03 329 0.05 -0.018 
   TENURE 292 2.68 329 2.73 -0.050 
Deal characteristics           
   DEAL_SIZE 292 0.17 329 0.03 0.146*** 
   MULTIPLE_ACQ 292 0.34 329 0.33 0.008 
   GOODWILL 292 0.45 329 0.47 -0.021 
   SERIAL 292 0.26 329 0.21 0.048 
   INTAN_GROW 292 0.01 329 0.01 -0.002 
Company characteristics           
   RESTATE 292 0.08 329 0.09 -0.012 
   ARC 292 449.54 329 461.29 -11.754 
   SIZE 292 8.46 329 8.79 -0.324*** 
   LEV 292 0.32 329 0.32 -0.004 
   MTB 292 5.93 329 7.20 -1.274 
   LOSS 292 0.32 329 0.26 0.067* 
   FOREIGN 292 0.49 329 0.62 -0.130*** 
   SEG 292 8.58 329 9.52 -0.947** 
   INTAN 292 0.36 329 0.30 0.061*** 
  TOTAL_CAM 292 2.24 329 1.39 0.854*** 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the initial sample. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of the 
final sample after removing influential observations. I remove 47 influential observations identified using influence 
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diagnostics with a Cook’s Distance greater than 4/n. Panel C reports the tests of differences in means and p-values 





Auditor Characteristics, Deal Characteristics, and M&A-related CAMs 
 CAM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IMPORTANCE 0.210 0.072  0.468 
 (0.700) (0.904)  (0.571) 
NAS -0.787 -0.689  0.401 
 (0.214) (0.291)  (0.681) 
ACQ_EXPERT -0.599 -0.529  -0.315 
 (0.220) (0.283)  (0.678) 
TENURE -0.049 -0.047  0.097 
 (0.584) (0.606)  (0.466) 
AUDITOR_1  -0.207  -0.486 
  (0.542)  (0.313) 
AUDITOR_2  0.223  0.128 
  (0.510)  (0.789) 
AUDITOR_3  -0.653*  -1.382*** 
  (0.063)  (0.005) 
AUDITOR_4  -0.154  -0.461 
  (0.662)  (0.365) 
DEAL_ SIZE   1.561*** 1.663*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
MULTIPLE_ACQ   -0.660*** -0.621** 
   (0.007) (0.014) 
GOODWILL   -0.586 -0.506 
   (0.195) (0.271) 
SERIAL   -0.148 -0.207 
   (0.579) (0.469) 
INTAN_GROW   0.595 0.068 
   (0.720) (0.970) 
Constant 0.131 0.278 -4.334*** -4.603*** 
 (0.617) (0.457) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
N 621 621 621 621 
AUC 0.534 0.596 0.899 0.908 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the determinants of an M&A-related CAM using Logit Regression. P-values 
appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 





The Determinants of M&A-related CAMs  
 CAM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
IMPORTANCE -0.411 (0.691) -0.259 (0.825) 0.734 (0.575) 
NAS 1.007 (0.430) 0.910 (0.482) 0.771 (0.575) 
ACQ_EXPERT -0.536 (0.590) -0.651 (0.530) -1.032 (0.382) 
TENURE 0.093 (0.581) 0.082 (0.633) 0.134 (0.468) 
DEAL_SIZE 1.886*** (0.000) 1.922*** (0.000) 2.131*** (0.000) 
MULTIPLE_ACQ -0.826** (0.011) -0.849** (0.011) -0.971*** (0.006) 
GOODWILL -0.292 (0.632) -0.354 (0.564) -0.282 (0.668) 
SERIAL 0.604 (0.105) 0.670* (0.080) 0.689* (0.085) 
INTAN_GROW 1.612 (0.512) 1.710 (0.485) 2.206 (0.436) 
RESTATE -1.270** (0.025) -1.447** (0.015) -1.210* (0.062) 
ARC 0.002 (0.128) 0.002 (0.185) -0.000 (0.870) 
SIZE -0.313** (0.041) -0.331** (0.040) -0.540*** (0.003) 
LEV -1.282* (0.096) -1.440* (0.070) -1.011 (0.273) 
MTB -0.007 (0.323) -0.009 (0.229) -0.008 (0.422) 
LOSS -0.556 (0.143) -0.490 (0.204) -0.120 (0.777) 
FOREIGN -0.723** (0.039) -0.898** (0.014) -0.526 (0.215) 
SEG -0.050** (0.010) -0.048** (0.013) -0.054*** (0.007) 
INTAN -0.431 (0.585) -0.574 (0.473) 0.240 (0.797) 
TOTAL_CAM 2.741*** (0.000) 2.729*** (0.000) 2.877*** (0.000) 
AUDITOR_1     0.811 (0.214) 1.594** (0.028) 
AUDITOR_2     0.248 (0.691) 0.825 (0.223) 
AUDITOR_3     -0.270 (0.674) 0.496 (0.481) 
AUDITOR_4     -0.024 (0.972) 0.370 (0.608) 
IND_2         -0.183 (0.879) 
IND_3         0.632 (0.630) 
IND_4         -1.815 (0.265) 
IND_5         -0.281 (0.852) 
IND_6         2.255* (0.078) 
IND_7         -1.116 (0.356) 
Constant -7.215*** (0.000) -7.010*** (0.000) -6.545*** (0.000) 
       
N 621  621 621 
AUC 0.963  0.964 0.970 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the determinants of an M&A-related CAM using Stepwise Logit Regression. 
Regarding auditor and industry indicators, AUDITOR_5 and IND_1 are in the intercept. P-values appear in 
parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 
percent levels. Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
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TABLE 5 
The Determinants of M&A-related CAMs using Stepwise Logit Regression 
  CAM 
 Coeff. p-value 
AUDITOR1 0.934** (0.018) 
DEAL_SIZE 2.084*** (0.000) 
MULTIPLE_ACQ -0.915*** (0.007) 
SERIAL 0.701* (0.064) 
SIZE -0.463*** (0.001) 
RESTATE -1.215** (0.038) 
FOREIGN -0.627* (0.088) 
SEG -0.053*** (0.005) 
TOTAL_CAM 2.902*** (0.000) 
INDUSTRY4 -1.733 (0.113) 
INDUSTRY6 2.115*** (0.000) 
INDUSTRY7 -1.185*** (0.003) 
constant -6.557*** (0.000) 




Notes: This table reports the results for the determinants of an M&A-related CAM using Stepwise Logit Regression. 
P-values appear in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical 




Predicted and Actual CAMs 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Predicted CAMs 
Variable N Mean Std Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Probability_CAM 668 0.469 0.368 0.028 0.087 0.438 0.863 0.966 
Predict_CAM 668 0.367 0.482 0 0 0 1 1 
 











N 214 324 99 31 668 
Percentage 0.320 0.485 0.148 0.046 1 
 











1-PwC 0.333 0.509 0.119 0.038 159 
2-EY 0.400 0.394 0.167 0.039 180 
3-Deloitte 0.197 0.585 0.156 0.061 147 
4-KPMG 0.331 0.500 0.136 0.034 118 
5-Non Big4 0.328 0.422 0.172 0.078 64 
 










IMPORTANCE 0.126 0.128 0.109 0.106 
NAS 0.143 0.160 0.162 0.164 
ACQ_EXPERT 0.037 0.050 0.013 0.000 
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